Osprey's examination of the Meiktila campaign of WOrld War II (1939-1945). In the spring of 1944, Japanese 15th Army was shattered at Imphal and Kohima, allowing General William Slim, commander of 14th Army, to liberate Burma overland from India – a task considered impossible by the British chiefs of staff. Overcoming immense logistical problems, Slim coordinated a precisely timed attack along a 200-mile front, the longest opposed river crossing of the entire war, and an armored dash behind enemy lines that seized Meiktila, cutting Japanese supply lines. Mandalay fell and at the end of March 1945, with the battle lost, the Japanese withdrew south. Slim gave them no chance; Allied troops raced south and captured Rangoon. The Japanese army in Burma was finished.
"Argues that General Bill Slim's masterly but risky plan to outflank the main Japanese army at Mandalay deserves far more prominence and recognition. With the Japanese withdrawing, Slim's 14 Army, compromising the IV and XXXIII Corps, risked a perilous and punishing crossing of the mighty Irrawaddy at Mandalay opposed by the main Japanese army. To avoid this, Slim boldly decided to split his Army and send IV Corps on an arduous 300 mile march to seize the vital rail and road hub and the main Japanese administrative base of Meiktila, 85 miles south ... In this detailed analysis of this masterly manoeuvre, the author describes the plan, the risks, the actions, the seemingly insuperable logistic problems, and the efforts to retain US air support"--Jacket.
The Official Names of the Battles Actions Engagements Fought by the Land Forces of the Commonwealth During the Second World War 1939 1945
by 1956
Author: Great Britain. Battles Nomenclature Committee (1946-1955)
This volume completes a two-volume guide to manuscipts relating to South and South-East Asia held in public and private collections in Britain and Ireland. Volume 1, covering repositories in London, was published in 1989.
